

Terrorism: A Brief for Americans

The Scope, Causes, and Means for Reducing Terrorism,
Including Commentary on Iraq



A Report from American Respect and
the New America Foundation American Strategy Program

Terrorism: A Brief for Americans

The Scope, Causes, and Means for Reducing Terrorism, Including Commentary on Iraq

.....

Richard W. Vague

February 2007

.....

American Respect
PO Box 26324
Wilmington, DE 19899
www.americanrespect.com
www.americaspurpose.org
comments@americanrespect.com

“People don’t rebel because they are poor but because they are excluded from the system. To give people a stake in the economy, to prove to them that government is in the business of including them in formal society, is to put the terrorists out of business.”

Hernando de Soto

“Force does not subdue, it enrages.”

American Respect essay, September 2004

“The Marshall Plan for Europe stands as the greatest vindication of the argument that the tactics of terror must never be met with like behavior.”

Caleb Carr

“With malice toward none.”

Abraham Lincoln

INTRODUCTION

On November 7, 2006 Americans went to the polls and registered a deep concern on the course of the war in Iraq. For months ahead of the mid-term elections, they understood what leaders in the White House refused to acknowledge: A region spiraling downward in violence and bloodshed. American troops with no exit strategy. Most horrific of all, U.S. soldiers—America’s finest—tortured, killed and mutilated in a war making no observable progress in achieving the promised reduction in terrorism.

We hold the view that there is a better plan for exiting Iraq, one that is based on a clearer understanding of both that country’s history and the civil war underway there now. We also hold the view that there is a better path to reducing terrorism that is very different than the one currently being pursued. This new path adheres to the values that have made this country great—justice and strength combined with respect, humility and inclusiveness—and, if followed, can reaffirm this greatness. Unlike the current course, this plan is built upon a recognition and understanding of the causes and nature of terrorism.

Simply put, U.S. policies and actions in Iraq and throughout the world have increased world terrorism. The predictions made by our administration regarding the war have been badly wrong—predictions regarding how quickly it would end, how much it would cost, how we would be greeted as liberators, and how terrorism would decline as a result. Now predictions are no longer even offered.

The predictions have been wrong because their view of the cause of terrorism is wrong. Therefore the plan for defeating terrorism also

has been wrong. By leading our finest into the wrong war, and leaving them there too long, we have put them in an untenable situation. Haditha and Abu Ghraib are the failure of our leadership in Washington, not our soldiers on the front lines.

Tragically, the Administration’s policies, founded on misunderstanding, will most probably lead to the ascendance of yet another repressive regime or regimes in Iraq as the only way to restore “order” to the country. But the damage will not be limited to that country alone. Our mistakes in Iraq will haunt us throughout the region and beyond. Violent terrorism has accelerated and spread. More lives—military and civilian—certainly will be lost.

Our thesis is this: extremists who commit acts of terror exist in virtually all religions and societies, including our own. The most serious problems with terrorism occur in countries or regions where extremists have gained the sympathy and support of a broad population. Generally, that receptive population is enduring oppression or occupation. The most effective way to eliminate that support, to isolate—and thus neutralize—extremists, is to overcome occupation or oppression. And the most effective way to achieve that is through truly a decentralized and representative government. Opportunity must replace despair.

Crucially, power cannot be decentralized into a democracy if economic opportunity and wealth are not also decentralized in close to the same time frame. Economic development is an integral and indispensable part of the equation.

U.S. policies and actions in Iraq and throughout the world have increased world terrorism.

Many new plans and policy alternatives are now being put forward, including the report of the Iraq Study Group. Most, however, are built on these same misunderstandings that led us to where we stand today. Increasing the number of troops will not bring real progress in Iraq. Military strategy cannot be properly set until the political situation is rightly understood.

Nothing can excuse the horrors of terrorism. Yet terrorists are not born. They are created by external forces. This essay will explain the causes of terrorism, offer a solution to reducing terrorism, and outline a realistic path forward. This is not an exclusive, or unique, view. Rather, it incorporates, distills and synthesizes much that has been written by historians and commentators in this area, analyses that—unfortunately—have accurately forecast the events of the last three years. We cite the works of those experts here to augment our own opinions and buttress our recommendations. This essay points to a path away from our dilemma and toward better times.

This essay addresses these issues:

- What is terrorism?
- Why they hate us
- How to reduce terrorism
- What we have wrought in Iraq
- What we should do in Iraq
- Thoughts on Palestine, Lebanon and Iran
- How we should conduct relations with Islamic countries going forward
- The current administration's position on Iraq and terrorism

Robert Wright wrote in his July 16, 2006 article on “progressive realism,” *“Exploring the root causes of bad behavior, far from being a sentimentalist weakness, informs the deft use of real power.”* Arthur Schlesinger wrote, *“The great strength of history in a free society is its capacity for self-correction.”*

We heartily agree.

On a personal note, as primary author of this essay, I must state that I am a businessperson and have rarely been deeply involved or interested in politics. When I have, it has almost always been to support conservative policies and candidates. However, my passion is history, and because of that, I have been speaking out since before the invasion of Iraq against what history has shown would be the ineffectiveness of this administration's approach to the war on terror. My motives have included the safety of family and friends as well as the avoidance of death and destruction in Iraq. I believe our current course is making things worse. I also see firsthand the detrimental effects of this war on U.S. business. After the invasion, a barrel of oil spiked from \$28 to over \$70, short-term interest rates climbed by 4.25 percent, the U.S. deficit grew to record levels and global trade—a crucial engine of America's business growth—was impacted.

We hope that you will take the few minutes needed to read this essay. It is a message that we hope will be heard.

Richard W. Vague

American businessman and concerned citizen

February 2007

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

WHAT IS TERRORISM? WHAT CAUSES OTHERS TO BE INFLUENCED BY TERRORISTS?

In virtually every society and historical era there have been extremists who have used the tactics of terror to advance their causes. From White Supremacists, the Black Panthers and anti-government militia movements in America, to the anarchists in Europe and America in the early 20th century, to the IRA in Ireland and the Red Army in Japan in the aftermath of World War II, extremists have arisen using bombs and various means of terror to attack others in a way calculated to bring attention to their cause and inflict damage—directly or indirectly—on the perceived enemies of that cause.

There have been excellent works, including Marc Sageman's *Understanding Terror Networks*, Lawrence Wright's *The Looming Tower*, and Michael Lind and Peter Bergen's "A Matter of Pride" (*Democracy: A Journal of Ideas*, Winter 2007), which have shown that the core



**I WANT YOU
TO INVADE IRAQ**

© TomPaine.com Reprinted with permission.

members of these extremist groups are often young men, in many cases professional and well-to-do, who join because of alienation, humiliation and disaffection and through the pull of social and recruiting networks. These groups often come to embrace strong "isms"—religions or ideologies, including communism, fascism or the dicta of a charismatic leader—that bring a sense of purpose and a foundation for their causes. But disaffection and alienation, not religion or

ideology, are the common threads that bind these groups.

Of the thousands of such groups that exist or have existed, the validity of their causes is often questionable or worse. One element remains consistent throughout time and geography, however. These extremists believe themselves denied the resources or opportunity to advance their cause through conventional means. They believe acts of terrorism will gain them access and relief.

The historian Jay Winik, in a book about the American Civil War written before the 9/11 attacks and the current Iraq war, describes well what terrorists are and why terrorists succeed. In reading this passage, where Winik uses the term "guerilla"—the term coined to describe the terrorists fighting Napoleon—substitute the term "terrorist":

"[G]uerrilla warfare is and always has been the very essence of how the weak make war against the strong. Insurrectionist, subversive, chaotic, its methods are often chosen instinctively, but throughout time, they have worked with astonishing regularity....By luring their adversaries into endless, futile pursuit, guerrillas erode not just the enemy's strength, but, far more importantly, the enemy's morale as well." (Jay Winik, April 1865, HarperCollins, 2001, pp 147-8)

The fact that a weak group resorts to terrorist tactics to fight the strong does not excuse the horror and repugnance of their acts, but it is a pattern that is well-established.

In a comprehensive study of thousands of terrorist activities from the past half century, William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg conclude that such actions occur most often in stable democracies and suggest that is because of the openness and freedom within these societies. (They cite such examples as the Red Army Faction in Germany and the Ku Klux Klan in the United States.) But the extremists committing these terrorist acts rarely gain truly broad acceptance within a stable democracy because there are other available options to express discontent, notably the ballot.

The terms terrorists, extremists, insurgents, guerrillas, jihadists and fundamentalists have been used freely and in many cases interchangeably in discussions of al Qaeda, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and the Mideast. This has added much confusion and imprecision to the discussions. For our purposes, and in this thesis, our working definition will be this: Terrorism is a method for a weaker group, most often an extremist group, to fight an establishment or those in power. Terrorism can include any number of violent tactics—including targeted “guerrilla” attacks on small and unsuspecting parts of that in-power group’s military, and/or the intentional targeting of civilians for political purposes. The extremist group often uses an “-ism” as a cause or source of ideological strength against the perceived oppressors or occupiers—thus the terms jihadism and fundamentalism to describe these movements in the Middle East. If the extremist cause resonates, it will spread to a broader population. If large enough, it will trigger a civil war.

Our concern—one of the keys to this essay—are those situations where the issues advanced by the extremists come to be shared by a truly broad constituency within a country or affected group. That occurs when the issue in conflict resonates and there exist no bona fide channels for that broad population to find redress.

Across time and geography, extremism most often takes root and gains support only in situations where occupation and/or oppression

exist. In these circumstances, those holding power fail to adequately provide the affected population with any voice in government, property rights, opportunity for economic advancement, and personal freedom and safety. This is often accompanied by wholesale government corruption and harsh suppression of dissenting voices. The deprived feel powerless and humiliated. It is no coincidence that government’s failure to provide these basic needs—especially property rights and a true voice in governance—almost always creates or exacerbates extreme poverty. The truly poor are often receptive listeners to the message of extremists and become ready recruits for their cause.

Oppression, as we define it here, has taken the form of a strong, repressive central government such as existed in Saudi Arabia, Peru, and Egypt, or the decentralized chaos of warlords, as has been the case in Afghanistan—because in both examples the basic obligations of government described above are not met. Hear the voice of Carlos Marighella, writing in Brazil in 1969 in his *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*:

“The urban guerrilla is an implacable enemy of the regime, and systematically inflicts damage on the authorities and on the people who dominate the country and exercise power. The primary task of the urban guerrilla is to distract, to wear down, to demoralize the military regime and its repressive forces, and also to attack and destroy the wealth and property of the foreign managers and the Brazilian upper class.”

We will also include in our definition the oppression of a cultural, ethnic or religious group such as the Basques in Spain and the Serbian and Albanian situation in Kosovo. In some cases, these extremists are established or supported by an external state or entity. However, even in these cases, extremism will

not take root unless the message resonates with the general populace.

Examples of occupation, under whatever guise, include the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan which led ultimately to a generation of terrorists including the Taliban and Al Qaeda; the French occupation of Algeria which spawned the FLN, and the British occupation of Ireland which ultimately produced the IRA.

Importantly, whether a given population is justified in its perception of occupation or oppression is not within the scope of this paper to debate, and not all occupation or oppression leads directly to extremism. However, one thing is certain: for extremists to be harbored by the broad population, the perception of occupation or oppression has to be widely shared.

The Middle East is a breeding ground for terrorism because dictatorships and economic inequality abound. As Lawrence Wright wrote, referring to Al Qaeda and those recruited to the Afghan resistance to the Soviets:

“It was death, not victory in Afghanistan that summoned many young Arabs to Peshawar. ... The lure of an illustrious and meaningful death was especially powerful in cases where the pleasures and rewards of life were crushed by government oppression and economic deprivation. From Iraq to Morocco, Arab governments had stifled freedom and signally failed to create wealth at the very time when democracy and personal income were sharply climbing in virtually all other parts of the globe. Saudi Arabia, the richest of the lot, was such a notoriously unproductive country that the extraordinary abundance of petroleum had failed to generate any other significant source of income; indeed, if one subtracted the oil

revenue of the Gulf countries, 260 million Arabs exported less than 5 million Finns. Radicalism usually prospers in the gap between rising expectations and declining opportunities. This is especially true where the population is young, idle, and bored; where the art is impoverished; where entertainment--movies, theater, music--is policed or absent altogether; and where young men are set apart from the consoling and socializing presence of women. Adult illiteracy remains the norm in many Arab countries. Unemployment was among the highest in the developing world. Anger, resentment and humiliation spurred young Arabs to search for dramatic remedies.”
(Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower*, Knopf, 2006, pp. 106-107)

Muslim extremists are not qualitatively different than extremists of other countries, religions or eras. What is different is *quantitative*—the fact that there are over 1.3 billion Muslims. If a tiny fraction—0.01 percent—of a population of that size is extremist, it is a more material issue than if 0.01 percent of the 1.5 million Northern Irish were extremist in the 1970s, or 0.01 percent of the 20 million Peruvians were extremist in the 1980s, or 0.01 percent of the 120 million Russians were extremist in the years of incubation leading up to the Bolshevik revolution. The sheer size of the pool of the disaffected merits the attention we put forward in this essay.

In the Muslim world, poverty makes the population receptive to an extremist message. But the problem goes beyond subsistence. Paul Pillar, former deputy chief of the CIA's counterterrorism center, wrote:

“The challenge is not simply one of poverty ... Rather, it is one of

closed, state-dominated economies and undemocratic, unresponsive political systems, which deny citizens the opportunity to realize their full potential and to effect peaceful political change when they are dissatisfied with their lack of opportunities. ... And once people become alienated, it becomes harder to develop the entrepreneurial spirit needed for economic growth and the civic culture needed to make democracy work.” (Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2001, Brookings, p. xlvi.)

This is not a problem confined to one geographic region. Terrorism and its root causes are becoming part of a global reality. Writing in 1996, Robert Kaplan noted the connection between poverty and modern war:

“Scholars have been writing more and more about the corrosive effects of overpopulation and environmental degradation in the third world, while journalists cover an increasing array of ethnic conflicts that don’t configure within state borders. Of the eighty wars since 1945 ... forty-six were civil wars or guerrilla [read terrorist] insurgencies. Former UN secretary-general [Javier] Perez de Cuellar called this the ‘new anarchy.’ In 1993, forty-two countries were immersed in major conflicts and thirty-seven others experienced lesser forms of political violence: Sixty-five of these seventy-nine countries were in the developing [read poverty-stricken] world.” (Robert D. Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth, Vintage, 1996, p. 8)

Extremists broaden their support by doing two things: protesting an unpopular occupier

or government and offering services that government does not supply. We should not have been surprised that Hizbollah provided charitable services such as hospitals, schools, security and financial support to the dispossessed in its region of Lebanon. Nor should we have been surprised to learn that the Taliban opened schools in Afghanistan. Their respective governments simply weren’t fulfilling their basic obligations to the citizenry.

Examples abound: In Egypt oppression led to the Muslim Brotherhood; in Afghanistan the Taliban; in remote areas of India, the Naxalites, and the oppression of the Tsars in Russia led to revolution and Bolshevism.

Those holding power frequently play into the hands of the extremists, who may start with tactics that are mild. But government reprisals raise the level of deadliness until both sides are committed to an escalating cycle of violence and become hardened purveyors of extreme tactics. Extremists feed on these reprisals and in many cases welcome them, for they win new adherents to the cause. Popular support is essential if terrorism is to be sustained for long periods. Ultimately the conflict expands into what can rightly be called a civil war.

As the cycle of violence rises, the population’s resentment of its government grows. That resentment can spill over to include the government’s allies—e.g. Al Qaeda’s jihad against the United States for its perceived disproportionate support of Israel. Some government reprisals rise to extraordinary levels—witness Putin and Kadryov in Chechnya. Although governmental authorities there appear to have beaten back terrorism, they have only driven it underground for an extended period where it will mutate into a more virulent form.

As mentioned, the oppressive conditions that lead to extremism and enhance its appeal among the dispossessed are frequently accompanied by “-isms” or ideologies that provide a rallying message, a promise of solutions. This can be

a religion, a philosophy or the dogma of a charismatic leader that gives meaning to the extremism and potentially provides the broad population a psychological safe harbor against oppression.

In a number of Muslim countries, this has manifested itself in an extremist, or “fundamentalist,” form of the Islamic religion. The extremists’ message is this: secularism and modernity have disrupted lives and produced dictatorships, poverty and discrimination. The only way to restore purpose, dignity and social order is to turn away from this corrupted form of Islam, casting out the secular and falsely religious establishment. The oppressors are evil, it is claimed. They and their allies, including the West, must be overcome.

For Islamic fundamentalists, the primary enemy here is not the United States and the West, but rather the Muslim establishment, which has failed to prevent the corruption of a belief and to protect Muslim society from the unholy influence of the secular world, a world that has only brought poverty and misery to many. According to Reza Aslan:

“Fundamentalism, in all religious traditions, is impervious to suppression. The more one tries to squelch it, the stronger it becomes. Counter it with cruelty, it gains adherents. Kill its leaders, and they become martyrs. Respond with despotism, and it becomes the sole voice of opposition. Try to control it, and it will turn against you. Try to appease it, and it will take control.” (Reza Aslan, No god but God, Random House, 2005, p. 247)

Those few Islamic extremist groups who attack us commit acts of terrorism *not* because we are free. We are, in fact, a secondary target chosen because we support governments and policies that are sources of their oppression, and because attacking us brings greater attention

to their cause. Al Qaeda’s current rallying cry is the perceived injustice in Palestine and the presence of a non-Muslim military (ours) on sacred Muslim soil in Saudi Arabia. Previously, it was the anger over the secular Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which gave birth to the movement. Hizbollah was formed because Israel was occupying Lebanon. Hamas wants to reclaim lost territory in Palestine. The driving force behind them all is not simply ideology, but rather, achieving specific events and outcomes. Resolve the problem and the motivation fades.

Many extremist groups spawn “splinter” groups, which are usually smaller than the original. The IRA in Ireland formed multiple splinter groups, including the “Real IRA” and “INLA” to name just two. Al Qaeda can be viewed as a type of splinter group most directly stemming from the Muslim Brotherhood. These offshoots evolve for one of several reasons: the core group begins to negotiate, and the splinter group feels that is an intolerable compromise; the splinter group believes an increased level of terrorism is needed to further its agenda; or another nation or outside influence sponsors or incites the splinter group to more aggressive behavior.

These splinter groups have ambitions that are more extreme and less closely aligned to the true grievances of the broad population. For example, some current Islamic splinter groups believe that all non-Islamic governments must be overthrown and brought into the Muslim fold—a view hardly shared by the bulk of the citizenry of Islamic nations.

Because they are generally smaller and less established, they must go to greater lengths to gain notoriety. Prior to 9/11, Osama Bin Laden was finding it hard to gain the notoriety he was seeking, and Al Qaeda was simply one group vying for ascendancy within the Muslim world:

“...Bin Laden found himself, by the mid-1990’s, bottled up in the Afghan badlands, having been stripped of his Saudi nationality

and booted out of ostensibly “Islamist”-ruled Sudan. Among his camp mates, the ragtag leftovers of the Muslim foreign legion of Afghanistan, the fire of armed jihad still burned. But their passion lacked a satisfactory immediate outlet. Radical insurgencies had been defeated, or severely constrained, across a number of local fronts, from Egypt to Algeria to the Southern Philippines. Most ordinary Muslims in these countries...had not merely failed to join in the fight but questioned its very premises.

“With these so-called ‘near enemies’ in Asia and the Middle East proving inconveniently resilient, the idea emerged of transferring jihadist zeal instead to the ‘far enemy.’ Hitting the United States would in itself score points, considering that America was seen as a pillar of support for compromised Muslim regimes, such as Egypt’s and Saudi Arabia’s, that bin Laden had as his target. The boldness of attacking the strongest world power would propel Islam (or rather, the jihadists’ version thereof) onto the geopolitical stage as a force demanding equal stature. This would not only inspire reluctant jihadists to join in the fight. It would also help cement the broader, and growing, Muslim sense that their faith was somehow under threat, and needed vigorous defense.

*“This strategy is not original.”
(Max Rodenbeck, “The Truth About Jihad,” The New York Review of Books, August 11, 2005, p. 52)*

In cases where the extremist cause takes root among a larger populace as a result of occupation or oppression, and when that occupation or oppression continues for extended periods, then the terrorism becomes more virulent. Additional splinter groups are likely to form, the probability of a diaspora of experienced terrorists from that country to other countries increases, and an ultimate resolution becomes more difficult. Over the long haul, most extremist initiatives have resulted in “solutions” worse than the original problem. As horrible as the Tsarist reign became, for example, the Bolshevism that replaced it under Lenin and eventually Stalin was worse.

WHY THEY HATE US

Why do they hate us? By and large, *they* don't. The very inference that all Muslims hate us is reminiscent of the mantra of the 1950s and 1960s that all communists hated us. That, too, proved to be largely false.

There are over 1.3 billion Muslims among the 6.6 billion people in today's world, and 45 of the world's 193 nation states are largely or predominantly Muslim. The economic circumstances, religious attitudes and political preferences of these Muslims vary widely, of course. The vast majority are moderate, responsible citizens, who are the same as people everywhere. They want meaning and purpose in their lives, sustenance and economic opportunity, family, friends and happiness. They need to matter and to have respect. As President George Herbert Walker Bush has said, "*People everywhere want the same things.*"

But there are millions among these Muslims who are despairing, disenfranchised and excluded, and are thus vulnerable to the messages and leadership of extremists. Some heed that message; many others become sympathizers, most often because they are looking for nothing more than hope and a better life. Only a small number hate us—but that number is rising.

In this section of the essay we will speak to the further reasons the broad Muslim population under occupation or oppression would be susceptible to these extremists and this hatred—primarily the legacy of colonial subjugation, the rapid pace of global social change and dire economic poverty. Cultural and religious

factors are secondary to these. Religious factors come into play primarily where stress and change have precipitated a broader return to fundamentalism as discussed below.

For well over two centuries, especially since the Industrial Revolution, European countries have subjugated Islamic nations. 41 of the 45 predominately Muslim nations in the world were former European colonies or subsumed as Soviet states, and these imperialists—England, France and others—moved in varying degrees to dispossess the people of their land, assets, self-determination and religion. Colonial status prevented or impaired the development of leadership and political infrastructure, and therefore most—37 by our imperfect calculation—have not transitioned from colonies to bona fide democracies. Most are effectively dictatorships, many with the complicity of the West, and most remain in economic disrepair.

This imperialism was too often accompanied by murder, torture, rape, de facto enslavement and humiliation. When citizens of these colonies protested or rebelled, they were suppressed or crushed. In no small way, this legacy of humiliation remains.

At its most extreme, this colonial attitude was captured by Cecil Rhodes when he stated, "*[W]e Britons are the first race of the world, and the more of the world we inhabit, the better it is for the human race.*"

A colonial legacy is not by itself sufficient to cause extremism, but it has contributed. The list of the 41 current Muslim countries that were formerly colonies is long and includes Algeria,

They want meaning and purpose in their lives, sustenance and economic opportunity, family, friends and happiness. They need to matter and to have respect.

Pakistan, India, Somalia, Indonesia and (de facto) Egypt. In the aftermath of World War I, Britain and France carved Middle Eastern colonies out of the defeated Ottoman (Turkish) Empire and kept many countries under their direct rule, including modern-day Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

The West has also intervened in Muslim countries that were not its colonies. When Iranians took steps toward a democracy in 1953 by electing their own premier, the United States, because of concerns about Soviet influence on Iran and oil supplies, acted to depose the democratically elected premier and return the Shah to power. The Shah's regime was corrupt and oppressive, but was supported by the United States because it was anti-Soviet and receptive to U.S. directives regarding oil and other foreign policy matters.

Years earlier, the Russians also had helped suppress an Iranian pro-democracy movement. During the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11, hundreds were imprisoned and many executed for their reform efforts. The Iranian revolution of 1979—and its hostage crisis under Ayatollah Khomeini, which so deeply shocked the U.S. public—was in many respects a reaction to these two foreign interventions. In addition, the United States armed and trained tens of thousands of Muslims as part of its Cold War efforts, most notably against the USSR after the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Osama bin Laden was a beneficiary of this support. And the U.S. intervened to aid Saddam Hussein in Iraq's war with Iran.

The United States also played a significant role in the establishment of Israel in 1948, which to this day helps define the Muslim world's view of the policies of the West in general and the U.S. in particular. This is not to suggest that the U.S. should not have supported its creation. Rather, as a result of that action, our country now has a particular responsibility to help bring about a fair, impartial and balanced solution to the dispute between Israel and Palestine. We are strongly supportive of the existence and continued health of Israel, but circumstances in Palestine continue to contribute profoundly to concerns and adversarial attitudes between Muslims and the West, with deadly consequences throughout the Middle East, Europe and the world. A balanced resolution to this Palestinian dilemma is one of the keys to reducing global terrorism. That fact has been under recognized.

The United States has recently backed highly repressive Middle Eastern regimes. This is not a new phenomenon. Historically, we supported many of these regimes because of the need for Cold War allies as well as oil. Thus, the West appears to be tacitly supporting repression, imprisonment of dissenters and economic injustice, in which a select few reap great wealth while the majority is excluded from opportunity

The U.S. invasion of Iraq—without the support of the United Nations and against the conclusions of U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix about the presence of weapons of mass destruction—has added considerably to the



Islamic world's suspicions. Many hold that the oil fields of Iraq were as much a motivation for the invasion as any other factor. And the horrors that occurred within the Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay prisons profoundly color the current views of many Muslims regarding Western justice and morality. (Ironically, experts have long known that the surest way to get information from prisoners is not through torture, but by establishing trust and rapport.)

Beyond this, Muslim and other developing countries also are struggling with the onrush of global social change, which, in turn, has stirred profound transformations in all aspects of daily life, including the family. For Muslim societies, this change *“is roaring ahead much faster and transforming the lives of many more people. Britain supported just 8 million people when it began its 250 year progression from the farm to the laptop. Indonesia is making that same journey in only four decades—with a population of more than 200 million.”* (Hernando De Soto, *The Other Path, Basic*, 1989, p. xxxiv.)

Rapid change often destabilizes. It causes people to seek out the traditions and the perceived certainty of the past. The alienating and disruptive effects of the modern world was captured in 1978 by Michel Foucault, one the more notable philosophers of the 20th century, who put his finger directly on the pulse of the current Muslim unrest while reporting from the Shah's Iran:

*“Foucault could see how the experience of deprivation, loneliness, and anomie made many Muslims in urban centers turn **to** rather than **away from** Islam; how there was little ‘protection’ for the millions of uprooted Muslims except in Islam, which for centuries has regulated everyday life, family ties, and social relations with such care. Foucault could also see how, in the absence of any democratic politics, Muslims*

used Islamic themes of sacrifice and martyrdom to challenge despotic and corrupt rulers who claimed legitimacy in the West as modernizers and secularizers. Foucault also managed to see that this Muslim revolt was unlikely to be confined to Iran. The West had deemed modernization and securitization as the highest aim for Muslim societies ever since it began to dominate them in the nineteenth century. But the process, now advanced by westernized postcolonial elites, of uprooting people from their traditional cultures and forcing them into Western-style cities and occupations was only likely to produce more converts to political Islam.” (Pankaj Mishra, *“The Misunderstood Muslims,” The New York Review of Books*, November 17, 2005, p. 15)

A society coping with stress often turns to the certainties of tradition and the past as it confronts the unknown. This helps explain the movement toward fundamentalism within Islam. Fundamentalism strips away the “new.” Fundamentalism lends meaning to an extremist movement. Widespread stress and uncertainty can make the certainty of the fundamentalist message more appealing to a broader audience. Not all fundamentalists embrace terrorism, nor are all terrorists fundamentalists. Nor is the phenomenon of embracing fundamentalism in the face of societal upheaval exclusive to Islam or the Middle East.

All religious traditions contain certain exclusionary tenants, yet practitioners of those religions—Islam, Christianity and Judaism—have found ways to coexist productively with other faiths in society. Examples abound in the history of all three of these great religions. In times of profound change or stress, however, some factions within those three religions have

embraced fundamentalist, exclusionary or hostile principles.

All this helps to set the stage for understanding terrorism in the Middle East. But what about terrorism in places like Britain and Spain? As Europe's own population growth has slowed, and in some countries declined, immigrants—including millions of Muslims—have filled the continued demand for the workers necessary to sustain economic expansion. This population regularly faces discrimination and disenfranchisement in the new countries where they find themselves—exclusion from better jobs, political office, social services and other vital resources.

Whether in their home countries or as immigrants elsewhere, those enduring extreme economic poverty also labor under difficult social pressures. People seek relief. Fundamentalists purport to have solutions and actively market them. It should have surprised no one that when the citizens of Palestine and Egypt finally had a chance to vote, many voted for fundamentalist opposition parties. After all, the current regime was failing them and these parties were offering the promise of a better life.

Two other factors are inextricably intertwined in this equation. The creation of the Israeli state in 1948 and the world's dependency on oil, both of which have only heightened the stakes and complicated the solutions.

HOW TO REDUCE TERRORISM

To overcome the terrorism that is rooted in the Middle East, we must do these things:

We need to make a comprehensive, concerted and sustained global effort to seek out and capture terrorists that have attacked the United States. Enlisting other nations of the world in this effort is critical.

We must provide domestic protection against terrorist acts, including gathering effective intelligence regarding potential attacks. We must know the location and status of nuclear materials around the world. At present, these safeguards are not receiving the funding or priority required because of the cost and distraction of the Iraqi war.

Achieving these goals will only serve to reduce the negative. The infinitely more important and effective work requires building up the positive.

In cases where the cause of the extremists has gained currency among a larger constituency, and where these extremists are carrying out acts of terrorism, the population will only rescind its support if occupation or oppression is addressed. The evidence that this has occurred will be a withdrawal or acceptable compromise with the occupier, or, to replace the oppression, the implementation of government that truly fulfills its basic obligations: providing the affected population with a genuine voice in government, enforcement of property rights, broad opportunity for economic advancement, and personal freedom and safety—along with the absence of large-scale public corruption and

suppression of dissenting voices. We cannot reform terrorists, but we can eliminate their appeal. We do not need to appease terrorists, rather we must study closely the plight of the population of those countries that have supported them and use our influence to ease their plight. If we succeed, we deprive terrorists of their sympathizers and their prospective recruits.

The current administration is correct in its belief that bona fide democracy is a key in defusing terrorism. Its mistake was implementing this strategy first in Iraq for reasons we will discuss.

Merely moving a government toward democracy is not enough. There must be an equally vigorous effort to develop economic opportunity—a modern day Marshall Plan. Political power cannot become or remain broadly distributed unless economic power and opportunity and assets are also broadly distributed. Progress on either the political or economic front can accomplish much, yet only progress on both together can bring change that is truly enduring.

There are many ways to assist a country in distributing economic opportunity and wealth. Direct aid has its place, yet cannot achieve the job of broadly and sustainably sowing opportunity when it is poorly conceived, coordinated or managed—which is all-too-frequently the case. Such aid often breeds corruption and benefits only the few. Micro lending programs have shown promise, as have special economic zones. Some of the most successful efforts have been built on trade and

Political power cannot become or remain broadly distributed unless economic power and opportunity and assets are also broadly distributed.

land reform and distribution.

Consider briefly the example of Peru, a country of great poverty, which in the 1980s was emerging from a military dictatorship and undergoing rapid change with a concentration of wealth and land ownership among the elite. A terrorist organization known as the Shining Path bombed government buildings and attacked citizens. They were terrorists in every modern sense of the word, but in this case they advocated communism as a solution to the despair of Peruvians. Hernando de Soto writes of the choices facing government leaders:

*“As early as 1984, I became convinced that the Shining Path (Sendero) would never be eliminated as a political option without first being defeated in the world of ideas. Like many, I felt that Sendero’s major strength stemmed from its intellectual appeal to those excluded by the system and its ability to generate a political cause for natural leaders, whether in universities or shantytowns... Research told us that one of the primary functions of terrorists in the Third World—what buys them acceptance—is protecting the possessions of the poor, which are typically outside the law. In other words, if government does not protect the assets of the poor, it surrenders this function to the terrorists, who can then use it to win the allegiance of the excluded.” (Hernando de Soto, *The Other Path*, Basic Books, 1989, pp. xiv-xxxix)*

The Peruvian government continued moving toward a more representative form of governance, established and enforced property rights, decentralized decision-making to include citizen input, and transferred public land to private ownership among the disenfranchised.

This unlocked a large reservoir of wealth and entrepreneurship within that country. After undertaking these efforts, the Shining Path faded in size and relevance until little remained. Not because the government had attacked its members, but because the government had attacked the root causes of their support. A surprising way to fight terrorism? The weapon is the spirit and power of the individual, not guns.

It is economic injustice that fuels global terrorism, writes De Soto, not cultural heritage. As a powerful example, De Soto reports that despite the world’s poor having accumulated over \$9 trillion of real estate, it is their lack of



property rights—clear title and a legal system to support it—that prohibits them from leveraging these assets into new capital, and thus retards their progress.

Democracy is a powerful instrument. The current Administration is correct in this regard. But merely the ability to vote is not sufficient. The effectiveness of America’s government rests on three principles of limit, each of which acknowledges the corrupting influence of power:

- Explicit *limitation of government*, as embodied in our constitution, especially such keys as habeas corpus

- and property rights
- *Checks and balances* created by a true separation of powers, including powers over the military
- *Decentralization* of government so that many decisions can truly be made at the local level.

Representative government by its very nature is not exclusionary. But we should not be misled by false indicators of open government, staged by some countries to create the impression that they are advancing in the proper direction. These are charades; voters are given no bona fide choices; opposition is suppressed.

Government reform, while important, is not sufficient on its own. Broad economic progress must also occur. Sustained, across-the-board economic prosperity *cannot* occur in a country unless property rights are assured and power is distributed and decentralized.

The United States, in conjunction with the community of nations, should use its economic support, its trade policy, and every other non-military means of positive influence it possesses to encourage countries to migrate in this direction. The path to democracy is complex, and while change will not happen overnight, incremental steps can be taken.

An important additional note must be made. Recent terrorist attacks have occurred in countries like Spain and Britain, where occupation and oppression do not exist in the manner that we have described above. Rather, this terrorism reflects the migration of violence

from countries where it does. Palestine is cited more than any other cause. Close behind is the support of countries like Britain for perceived occupiers and oppressors. These acts of terrorism also reflect the scars that result from the colonial legacy and the stark economic disparities in these countries relative to the West. Muslim immigrants from the Middle East residing in London, as one example, have relatives and friends in Palestine, Iraq and elsewhere and often deeply share their concerns. It follows that extremism will not significantly abate in a place like London unless occupation and oppression in the Middle East abate as well.

The extremism in counties like Britain and Spain reflects the plight and alienation of any excluded minority in any society—and in this sense is at least partially akin to the black civil rights movements and race riots in the United States in the 1960s. As America has learned, progressive policies of inclusion—and policies that leave room for the customs and traditions of these immigrants—are a necessary part of addressing the plight of an excluded minority. Properly conceived, these policies will convey a sense of welcome that will bring psychological integration—identification with, and loyalty to that

immigrant's new country. Contrast, for example, the vitriol to be found in America's newspapers and political speeches in the 1890s regarding Jewish, Italian and other immigrants with the contributions they provide to American society today.



WHAT WE HAVE WROUGHT IN IRAQ

We should recognize the true cost of invading Iraq.

The war has fueled terrorism. Our invasion has become a powerful rallying point for many in the Muslim world who regard it as unjust. In a national intelligence estimate completed in April 2006, America's National Intelligence Council concluded that the Iraq war has fueled the growth of Islamic extremism and terror groups and is being used to spread the global extremist message.

Thousands have traveled from around the world to Iraq to fight against this newest perceived aggression. Terrorist organizations across the globe, including Al Qaeda, have won new converts to their cause and their methods because of the invasion. Terrorist attacks are on the rise. According to terrorism specialist Peter Bergen:

"The president is right that Iraq is a main front in the war on terrorism, but this is a front we created" and "the Iraq war has expanded the terrorist ranks: the year 2003 saw the highest incident of significant terrorist attacks in two decades, and then, in 2004, astonishingly,

that number tripled [from 175 to 655]." (Boston Globe, July 17, 2005, "Study cites seeds of terror in Iraq," by Bryan Bender; Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec, 2005 with Alec Reynolds)

Note that the U.S. State Department declined thus far to release these statistics for 2005. A British Joint Intelligence Committee report from 2006 found that "Iraq is likely to be an important motivating factor for some time to come in the radicalization of British Muslims and for the extremists who view attacks against the U.K. as legitimate."

As was said by Republican Melvin Laird, secretary of defense under Richard Nixon and architect of "Vietnamization" (the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam), "Our presence is what feeds the insurgency."

According to a study by Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize-winning economist at Columbia University, and Linda Bilmes, of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, by invading Iraq, we are on course to spend \$1 trillion. *The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward – A New Approach* states that amount might be as much as \$2 trillion. That is money that instead



By Steve Sack, Star Tribune Editorial Cartoonist, 9/30/06

could have been used more productively.

War is not de facto wrong because it is expensive. If there are observable and measurable benefits to fighting a war, costs can be tolerated. But we can find no such benefits in the war in Iraq. It does nothing to advance the global search for terrorists. Rather, it breeds them.

The toll of war in purely economic terms has been high. Consider its impact on oil prices. Since the invasion began, the price of oil has increased from \$28 per barrel to a price above \$70, and is currently above \$50, due in large part to the disrupted supply and uncertainty the war has created. Some have attributed the price increase to heightened global demand, especially from China and India, but many analysts contend that, absent Iraq and the geopolitical fallout from our confrontations, the price of oil would be significantly lower—\$45 or less per barrel.

The national debt has increased by 30 percent to \$8.6 trillion during the war, a result of the record-setting deficits caused by the price of this war. The toll can be measured in other ways, as well.

We have taken our eyes off Afghanistan, resulting in an increase in insurgency and a dramatic increase in opium production. Terrorists—the Taliban and Al Qaeda—have gained a renewed foothold in Afghanistan. As we have seen elsewhere, the Taliban was initially welcomed because of the services and order

they restored to the country. The emergence of democracy there was not accompanied by the sustained resources to enable that government to properly serve the needs of the people. And so the country has “re-devolved” to the warlords and the Taliban.

Another toll has been the loss of enormous reserves of international and domestic goodwill. At home, some soldiers have concluded that we are spending lives and money for a people who do not want our help. And many Americans that

were content to let our government lead in this situation now feel differently, as the 2006 elections signaled.

The U.S. invasion has now brought Iraq into a civil war—by any meaningful current definition

of the term—and that civil war has been escalating. Over a million Iraqi citizens have fled the country, including disproportionate numbers in the professional classes, creating a potential refugee crisis in Jordan, Syria and elsewhere.

The Iraq war has brought forward the specter of corruption that inevitably accompanies armed conflict. *The Iraq Study Group Report* cites estimates of losses to corruption per annum in Iraq of \$5 to 7 billion. Allegations abound of misspent funds by contractors, and of oil and other resources being diverted to the personal enrichment of Iraqi politicians.

And, finally, this war has cost lives—over 3,000 U.S. military fatalities and a minimum of 46,000 Iraqi casualties and counting. However,



Clay Bennett / © 2006 The Christian Science Monitor. All rights reserved.

this estimate of Iraqi casualties is almost certainly low since a recently released U.N. report counts 34,000 Iraqi deaths in 2006 alone, and respected researchers overseen by Johns Hopkins University have estimated that the Iraqi death toll may be as many as 655,000 people.

WHAT WE SHOULD DO IN IRAQ

We must withdraw from Iraq, where our presence fuels the insurgency. We must participate — with a greatly reduced presence—in a solution crafted by Iraq itself, with involvement and assistance from a broad community of countries.

War has its place, unfortunately, and there have been and will be unavoidable times for the United States to use its military. We believe in the need for a strong and technologically advanced military. But in initiating this war, we ignored the dictum that military action must be a last resort. Violence begets violence.


Removing Saddam revealed realities that we did not properly consider and were unprepared for: the hideously oppressive rule by a Sunni minority of a Shiite majority, the deeply-seated and ferocious desire for retribution that had built up for over thirty years inside this Shiite majority, and a historically strong, well-established Kurdish separatist movement. While extremists from outside Iraq have entered that country, their activity is dwarfed by the Shiite retribution against Sunnis that is being enacted now in what has become a widespread and terrible civil war. Combine the lack of insight on those issues with the lack of an adequate strategy and it is easy to see how—and why—chaos ensued.

To understand what to do in Iraq, we must know how Iraq was created. In 1919, in the aftermath of World War I, as the Allied powers carved up the remains of the Ottoman Empire, the provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul were

disastrously pieced together to form a new country: Iraq. The unrest and rebellion from this 1919 combination was almost immediate. The city of Mosul, in particular, was a desirable prize because of the growing recognition of the value of oil, and the British

were in a position to take it:

“In 1919 there was no Iraqi people; history, religion, geography pulled the people apart, not together. Basra looked south, toward India and the Gulf; Baghdad had strong links with Persia; Mosul had closer ties with Turkey and Syria. Putting together the three Ottoman provinces and expecting to create a nation was, in European terms, like hoping to have Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs in one country... The population was about half Shia Muslim and a quarter Sunni... but another division ran across the religious one: while half the inhabitants



© Tribune Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.

were Arab, the rest were Kurds, Persians or Assyrians. The cities were relatively advanced and cosmopolitan: in the countryside, hereditary tribal and religious leaders still dominated. There was no Iraqi nationalism, only Arab..." (Margaret McMillan, *Paris 1919*, Random House, 2001, pp. 397-8)

We are making the same mistake almost a century later. In Iraq, we are insisting on the co-existence and co-governance of Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds who have long been adversaries. The Sunnis and Shiites are the two primary branches of the Muslim religion and have been intermittent adversaries since the seventh century CE. Under Saddam, the Sunnis had oppressed the Shiites intensely for decades. The Kurds have been without a stable homeland in the Middle East for centuries, and they have regularly been persecuted and in conflict during that period.

Iraq has remained a single entity primarily because it has been ruled by an iron hand in the period since 1919, from the British to Saddam Hussein. Unless there is a change in the current structure and design of our efforts in Iraq, the only option to overcome civil war may be another iron hand.

Any plan for Iraq must recognize and properly accommodate the reality of these three constituencies. If successful, democracy can proceed. We believe that a plan to further decentralize Iraq is now a more realistic and productive next step—if we can do it soon. Anything short of this increased federalism and local autonomy among the three groups and the energies of the country will remain absorbed by this civil war.

Involvement in this process by Iraq's neighbors and other countries around the world is absolutely necessary for success. *The Iraq Study Group Report* puts forth an excellent plan and process for accomplishing this and

accommodating the concerns and enlisting the support of these countries. The report falls short, however, on providing firm deadlines for the exit of our troops and on realistically addressing the civil war between Sunnis and Shiites.

Strategic Redeployment: A Progressive Plan for Iraq and the Struggle Against Violent Extremists authored by Lawrence Korb and Brian Katulis of the Center for American Progress is an effective plan for a responsible withdrawal. It has the advantage of specific dates, and leaves the management of the government where it belongs—with Iraqis—including the increased federalism and sectarian separation which is already rapidly occurring by default.

If deployed in consensus with other countries, better yet is the proposal advanced by Senator Joseph Biden and Leslie H. Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, which appropriately addresses the need for federalism and ethnic separation, and leans on America's more successful experience in Bosnia with the Dayton accords. David Brooks, columnist for the *New York Times*, has endorsed this approach and labeled it "soft partition." Soft partition has been advocated in different ways by Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institute with Edward Joseph, by Pauline Baker at the Fund for Peace, and in a more extreme version, by Peter Galbraith, former U.S. Ambassador to Croatia.

As stated in the Biden/Gelb plan:

"A decade ago, Bosnia was torn apart by ethnic cleansing and facing its demise as a single country. After much hesitation, the United States stepped in decisively with the Dayton Accords, which kept the country whole by, paradoxically, dividing it into ethnic federations, even allowing Muslims, Croats and Serbs to retain separate armies. With the help of American and

other forces, Bosnians have lived a decade in relative peace and are now slowly strengthening their common central government, including disbanding those separate armies last year... The idea, as in Bosnia, is to maintain a united Iraq by decentralizing it, giving each ethno-religious group — Kurd, Sunni Arab and Shiite Arab — room to run its own affairs, while leaving the central government in charge of common interests. We could drive this in place with irresistible sweeteners

and Shiite regions would each be responsible for their own domestic laws, administration and internal security. The central government would control border defense, foreign affairs and oil revenues. Baghdad would become a federal zone, while densely populated areas of mixed populations would receive both multi-sectarian and international police protection... The second element would be to entice the Sunnis into joining the federal system with an offer they couldn't refuse: ... money to make

Walt Danks MIN-LOUT.COM/ELECS/DANKS
©2008 THE WALT DANKS
1/22



IRAQI MINEFIELD.

© Tribune Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.

for the Sunnis to join in, a plan designed by the military for withdrawing and redeploying American forces, and a regional nonaggression pact. Iraq's new government of national unity will not stop the deterioration.

...

"The first is to establish three largely autonomous regions with a viable central government in Baghdad. The Kurdish, Sunni

their oil-poor region viable. The Constitution must be amended to guarantee Sunni areas 20 percent (approximately their proportion of the population) of all revenues. ...

"[T]he president must direct the military to design a plan for withdrawing and redeploying our troops from Iraq by 2008 (while providing for a small but effective residual force to combat terrorists

and keep the neighbors honest). We must avoid a precipitous withdrawal that would lead to a national meltdown, but we also can't have a substantial long-term American military presence...

*"Fifth, under an international or United Nations umbrella, we should convene a regional conference to pledge respect for Iraq's borders and its federal system A 'contact group' of major powers would be set up to lean on neighbors to comply with the deal." (Joseph R. Biden and Leslie H. Gelb, *Unity Through Autonomy in Iraq*, *New York Times*, May 1, 2006)*

Some have argued that this would be too difficult in Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk, because, unlike in Iraq's rural areas, they are not neatly divided into Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish enclaves. Yet this division is happening today through sectarian warfare, and Biden and Gelb's plan would achieve it in a less violent way. We would agree, though, that the Biden-Gelb proposal should only be implemented with the involvement of the community of affected countries, and as modified, where possible and prudent, through dialogue with those countries. That community, through preparation and financial support, would need to successfully address the concern that this separation may increase bloodshed and disruption. America must conduct itself in such a way as to truly engage all concerned, and avoid having this effort perceived, with adverse consequences, as simply a U.S. plan.

A powerful case has been made for this increased separation in Chaim Kaufmann's study of the analogous situation of ethnic civil wars, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars" (*International Security*, Spring 1996). After careful analysis of all such situations in the twentieth century, Kaufmann writes, "Stable resolutions of ethnic civil wars are possible, but only when the opposing

groups are separated into defensible enclaves." He then goes on to outline an orderly approach to attaining this separation.

In the eyes of a very large number of Iraqis, Saddam the oppressor has been replaced by the United States, the incompetent and deadly occupier. As discussed above, oppression and occupation are the two principle causes of extremism—and the Iraqi populace has now faced both in succession. The sooner we exit, the sooner the Iraqis will be relieved of the dictates of an occupier.

Without an approach such as that just outlined, we do not have a clear marker by which to know when we can leave, other than the judgment of our current administration. Not "standing down" until Iraqis "stand up" is a very hazy milestone by which to gauge our exit, especially given that things are getting worse.

An increase in troops—20,000 additional soldiers deployed to a nation of 26 million people—is now underway. This will only inflame the situation. Some have irresponsibly proposed that we seek to eliminate Muqtada al-Sadr. That would be disastrous, morally and militarily, and antagonize Iraq's majority Shia population.

Some say reducing our presence in Iraq will encourage terrorists, and all agree that a reduction might bring a temporary increase in violence. But this same stay-the-course rhetoric has been used before many times: many of the French didn't want to leave Algeria in 1961 because it would encourage the Muslim rebellion, but the French left and by 1963 the issue was quiet. Many didn't want America to leave Vietnam because it would encourage the communists, but we left, the communists did not extend their empire, and today Vietnam has embraced a vibrant and peaceful capitalism.

With a significantly decreased military presence, Iraq could truly proceed—hopefully on a democratic path. But the vital underpinnings to ensure economic advancement would still

be absent. U.S. economic assistance to Iraq has largely dried up. We need to redeploy the money we are spending on war into economic assistance, and deal with terrorism by attacking one of the fundamental contributors to terrorism—poverty and economic exclusion.

A side note: resource-rich countries such as Iraq tend to be less successful in making across-the-board, diversified economic progress—the famous “oil curse.” Wealth breeds dependency, and there is a tendency to simply exploit this wealth rather than to develop intellectual capital and other assets. Therefore another important, but difficult, idea to consider is creation of a fund that would distribute ongoing oil revenues as dividends to the citizens of Iraq, an idea put forward by Steven C. Clemons. This has been done in Alaska, where the annual dividend to a family of four recently amounted to \$8,000 per year. An Iraq Permanent Fund could send payments directly to Iraq’s 6 million households, making a huge difference to families in a country whose per capita gross domestic product is about \$1,800.

One final note: In resolving the problems in Iraq, as our President found out too late, we need to adopt a rhetorical tone of goodwill as opposed to one of antagonism.

THOUGHTS ON PALESTINE, HIZBOLLAH AND IRAN

Our foreign policy has become two-dimensional. Countries and populations are either evil or good—they are “either for us or against us,” as President Bush has declared. But the vast majority of the people in Iran, Lebanon and Palestine—and every other country for that matter—are no different than people everywhere, with issues too complex to be relegated to such simplistic categories. As George Washington said in his 1796 farewell address, at a time when passions on foreign affairs ran venomously high, “[C]ultivate peace and harmony with all,” adding, “The nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave...excessive partiality to one foreign nation and excessive dislike of another cause those whom they actuate to see danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts of influence on the other.”

Here are some factors regarding each:

Palestine

In discussing Palestine, we would reiterate that we are very strong supporters of the state of Israel, but we believe that many of Israel’s policies and actions have only served to decrease its security. Much Muslim concern regarding U.S. support of Israel stems from the view


that it is out of balance with U.S. support of Muslim countries. We would join those whose call is not for less support of Israel, but more support of Israel’s neighbors.

Palestine, where poverty is dire, is one of the most important, if not the most important, stumbling blocks on the path toward reducing terrorism. It can fairly be called the epicenter of concern for the Muslim community in the

Middle East and far beyond—to Muslim coffeehouses in London, Amsterdam and elsewhere. The Palestinian problem has existed in a pronounced form since decades before 1948. The displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians

pursuant to the establishment of Israel has led directly to the formation of the PLO, Hamas and other groups—arguably including Hizbollah. Regardless of the validity of the Palestinian Muslims’ perceptions of injustice, they believe them to be real.

We ignore this issue and leave it unresolved at our peril. Clearly, there is no solution that satisfies everyone. But just as clearly, there are solutions that will satisfy a plurality within the broader population. A solution must be crafted, agreed to, and then fully supported and enforced by a representative community of nations. Such a solution, when achieved, will



remove one of the major causes that led to the formation of Hamas, and to a slightly lesser extent other groups including Hizbollah and Al Qaeda.

That will just get us to the starting line, however. We must then vigorously make the investment to ensure that the citizens of Palestine are provided the basic services of government. We also must be a catalyst to the economic progress that should ensue from this by crafting a “Marshall Plan” fitted to the specific needs of this country.

Hizbollah in Lebanon

Lebanon was part of the Ottoman Empire that was intentionally divided by the victorious Allies pursuant to World War I and became a French colony. Colonial status at worst emasculates, and at best, retards establishment of organic leadership. Lebanon is an amalgamation of Sunni, Shiite, Christian and other religious sects.

When Palestinian extremists, including Yasser Arafat, became committed to reclaiming land they believed to be theirs, they used southern Lebanon as a base for their activities. Israel invaded southern Lebanon in 1982 to counter this extremist activity, but then remained as an occupier for almost two decades. Hizbollah, born as an extremist group to defy this occupation, is now a mature political organization. The current dilemma there would not exist if the Palestinian issue had been resolved early on. It was not.

As with other situations we have touched on here, many Lebanese believed their government had not adequately fulfilled its role, either

by resisting the occupation or by providing a circumstance whereby property rights were enforced and poverty eased. Hizbollah filled that void, evolving into an organization that provided services such as schools and hospitals. After Israel left in 2000, the world missed a critical opportunity to materially strengthen the Lebanese government, economy, institutions and infrastructure in a way that would have made Hizbollah less relevant. Instead, the corruption of Lebanon’s government continued, and daily life did not improve.



When Palestine held democratic elections, which brought the extremist group Hamas to power (replete with its extremist polemics), the global community responded by insisting on an immediate reform of its rhetoric. When that was not forthcoming, it intervened to shut down access to cash and assets—significantly exacerbating an already horrible economic situation. To the Islamic world, this action was egregious, and many contend that Hizbollah’s most recent incursion into Israel was in part a reaction to it.

In any event, Israel’s retaliation to that incursion, in keeping with our thesis, has only served to heighten the enmity on both sides. Every “cycle”—in which one side attacks and the other retaliates, in which we don’t find a peaceful solution that simultaneously provides for economic well-being—seems to guarantee that the next eruption will only be worse.

Iran

Things are more complex in Iran than in Iraq. It is important to view Iran in the context of

both its proud history—which dates back to the Persian Kingdom of Xerxes, Darius and Cyrus—and its present circumstance. As discussed earlier, Iran attempted forms of democracy in 1905 and in 1953, only to be thwarted by Russia, Great Britain and the United States. Even today's Iran, though clearly controlled by a Muslim theocracy, has some democratic elements.

Iran watched as three of its geographic neighbors—India, Pakistan and Israel—developed nuclear arms despite the objections of the United States and the international community. At the same time the U.S. moves to limit Iran's nuclear capability, Iranians blame the U.S. for supporting Iraq in its 1980s war with Iran, and for helping Saddam acquire the chemical weapons that caused so much suffering there. In early 2003, the Iranian Foreign Ministry sent a detailed proposal to Washington, stating it was prepared to open a dialogue on its nuclear program and to address concerns about it to such groups as Hizbollah if Washington would start lifting long-in-effect sanctions and refrain from destabilizing Iran. The United States rejected this proposal. Flynt Leverett, former senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council, argues that a “grand bargain,” resolving our concerns regarding Iran in exchange for security guarantees and a commitment to not attempt a regime change, could be an outcome of diplomacy, but that is an arrangement the U.S. is not currently willing to consider.

Iran has been reviled for its support of Hizbollah, but for many within the Muslim community, any such support is not regarded as different from U.S. military and financial support of Israel.

Iran is not a monolith, nor is any nation. Considerable internal disagreement and dissension exist there. It is a nation with a large population of young people eager for a better life. Large factions within Iran want to move toward secularization and modernization, and the current economic difficulties of the country

contribute to such views. Other factions within Iran are devout Muslims, yet nevertheless believe that it is inappropriate for their religious leaders to also be their political leaders—a view and debate that goes back to the beginnings of Islam. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad likely does not have as much power as represented in the popular press. But U.S. attempts to demonize him have made him stronger within his own country, given him greater visibility and importance, and weakened the efforts of any moderate or pro-U.S. factions in Iran.

President Ahmadinejad has made statements that have horrified much of the world. Speaking in Tehran in 2005, he said: “Israel must be wiped off the map.” We join those who resoundingly condemn these statements, but we recognize they may be savvy politics within his constituency. In an ironic development, given Ahmadinejad's role in the 1979 student uprisings in Iran, some Iranian university students have begun protests against his policies. His party has also very recently suffered electoral setbacks.

Ahmadinejad may be irrational and dangerous—as some have said. Dealing with Iran might someday require force, and we cannot rule that out. Regardless, the time is not now. There is room for diplomacy—albeit open-eyed, and careful. The world community should focus for the present on such diplomacy.

HOW WE SHOULD CONDUCT RELATIONS WITH ISLAMIC COUNTRIES GOING FORWARD

Any solution to reducing extremism must incorporate our relationship with all predominantly Muslim countries, not just one or a few. There are 45 predominately Muslim countries in the world—from Morocco in the northwest of Africa, to Syria and the United Arab Emirates, to Azerbaijan on the Caspian Sea, to Indonesia in the Indian Ocean, and more. Our relationship with each of these added together shapes the global Muslim community's view and posture toward the United States. Successful relations with Turkey and Morocco, for example, positively affect the perception of America in Syria (as well as among Muslim immigrants in Europe and elsewhere). Negative relations with Palestinians adversely affect our dealings with Muslims in Egypt. It is all deeply interconnected.

As noted in the Pew Global Attitudes Project, a crucial illustration is Indonesia, where in 2000, 75 percent of Indonesians viewed Americans favorably. This number fell to 15 percent after the invasion of Iraq, with 80 percent of Indonesians saying they fear an attack by the United States. However, Indonesian's approval of the U.S. climbed significantly after extensive U.S. aid to rebuild after the devastating 2004 tsunami.

Other than defense itself, America's principle obligation to the countries of the world is to be a good and enlightened neighbor—so that America's citizens and their institutions and enterprises can interact safely, productively and successfully with other countries' citizens, enterprises and institutions.

There are specific policies and priorities

that should characterize our relations with predominantly Islamic countries. If pursued, we believe these behaviors will increase global wealth, reduce terrorism, and set the stage for productive relations for generations to come. As Robert Wright wrote, *"America's fortunes are growing more closely correlated with the fortunes of people far away; fewer [foreign policy efforts] have simple win-lose outcomes, and more have either win-win or lose-lose outcomes."* (*An American Foreign Policy that Both Realists and Idealists Should Fall in Love With*, *The New York Times*, July 16, 2006)

Our relationship with each of these added together shapes the global Muslim community's view and posture toward the United States.

First, we should bring our very best efforts to bear to resolve hotspots on the frontiers of Islam—Palestine, as we have discussed, but also Kashmir and others. These hotspots are a much bigger contributor to the total problem than is understood or acknowledged. If ignored, they will continue to provide a powerful source of grievance and hate—and a powerful motivation for terrorists and the people they are trying to win over.

Anything the United States can do to incent these governments toward being more representative, and to improve the economic lot of their entire citizenry, is a powerful tool to combat terrorism.

But in almost all cases, we should seek first to work with those countries that invite us, and provide incentives that motivate other countries to seek us out. We should primarily use a carrot and not a stick. Many of these governments are making positive steps toward

more representative government and economic progress. They should be rewarded for what they have accomplished and encouraged to do more. The tools to accomplish this include economic development and trade support, as well as assistance on issues of governmental reform.

An excellent example is Turkey. Turkey has made bold strides in the twentieth century to become both democratic and secular. In furtherance of this, the nation is currently seeking admission into the European Economic Union, but may not succeed.

Many of its citizens regard membership in the EU as a referendum on the acceptance of Muslim countries into the West. It may very well be central to the successful progress

of U.S. anti-terror policy to seek to facilitate Turkey's EU candidacy.

As mentioned, 41 of the 45 predominately Muslim nations in the world were former European colonies or subsumed as Soviet states. This status impaired the growth of leadership and political infrastructure. Most have not transitioned to bona fide democracies and most are still in economic disrepair. 20 of these 45 are oil exporting nations. As we have said, significant resource wealth generally retards economic and political progress.

After World War II, the United States used its economic prowess to stave off world chaos with the Marshall Plan in Europe, one of history's most magnanimous and astute initiatives. As part of this plan, the U.S. spent over \$200 billion (in today's dollars) to help rebuild

European economies which were in real danger of being taken over by the Soviet Union, or plummeting into economic and social chaos, or both:

"The public outcry that would have been raised had Germany (been bombed with the atomic bomb) would likely have been similarly muted (as with Japan), and for the same reason: the two countries were not only terrorist states but expansionist terrorist

states, and their grim fates (for fire-bombing was in many ways a horror equal to nuclear attack) were never considered by the vast majority of the world's citizens, and certainly not by those

who had suffered most at their hands, as anything other than just. All of which made it only more remarkable that the United States should have decided, when Germany and Japan finally lay prostrate, to rebuild both countries and make them viable nations once more. The generosity embodied in the Marshall Plan for Europe and the similar measures overseen in Japan by General Douglas MacArthur stand as the greatest acts of not only civilian but military generosity in the history of the world, as well as the greatest vindication of the argument that the tactics of terror must never be



*met with like behavior; for both Germany... and Japan responded to this unprecedented decency by rejoining the community of constructive, civilized nations. ...Postwar reconstruction ... can ... be viewed as the clearest demonstration of the most important of all lessons to be learned from the history of warfare-- the enlightened self-interest embodied in the embrace of former enemies..." (Caleb Carr, *The Lessons of Terror*, Random House, 2002, pp. 196-7)*

If we make it our policy to focus on building up Muslim nations, as opposed to making war, terrorism will begin to recede.

Our support should be carefully directed so as not to simply enrich the corrupt. Measures should be in place to gauge the effectiveness of these overall efforts. A scorecard for success in building up and thus combating extremism would be a simple one to create. We could measure the growth in the size of the middle class and the breadth of inclusion of people in the political process in each of these countries. These are readily quantified. If the number of citizens legitimately participating in governmental decisions—especially through bona fide elections—in a given year is greater than the previous year, and if the size of the middle class rises from one year to the next, the underpinnings of terrorism in those countries will begin to abate.

It has not been a mistake to push for democracy in the Middle East. The mistake was pushing for it militarily in Iraq—and without first addressing more fundamental issues. We should instead have done such things as nurtured the fledgling democracy in Afghanistan, encouraged the continued movement toward democracy in Morocco, continued to positively engage and support Turkey in its democratic efforts, and done the like in a number of other countries.

There are risks, of course. In some nations, there has been movement toward democracy but the outcomes have been worrisome. In Palestine, a true election was held, but the citizens voted for extremists. This was to be expected, because the incumbents had not succeeded in staving off military humiliation and creating a path out of economic distress. The citizens of Palestine are among the poorest in the world. Unless we help to equitably relieve and resolve the egregious conditions in the region, we cannot reasonably expect a different outcome. In Egypt, where any movement toward truly free political contests would result in large gains for the Muslim Brotherhood, the situation is similar. Egypt has been highly repressive towards any party that has a genuine chance of unseating those in power. Its citizens are politically restrained and excluded, and poverty is pervasive, so no other result is likely. Yet large-scale efforts to decentralize wealth and economic opportunity could create a more moderate outcome. U.S. priorities should be clear—the true decentralization of power and economic opportunity—even though these electoral risks exist. And most Islamic political parties—including those in Jordan, Kuwait and Morocco—are peaceful.

Many people have mistakenly suggested that the terrorism in the Middle East is somehow related to the intrinsic characteristics of Islam. Some believe there exists an inherent antagonism within Islam against Christians and Jews. We attribute that misperception primarily to fundamentalists and splinter extremists. Though multiple interpretations of the Koran are possible, it is crucial to note that there is not a structurally irreconcilable conflict between Islam and Christianity, or Islam and Judaism. Note the treatment of Jews and Christians under of the Prophet Muhammad, born 552 AD, and under Islam in the years immediately after:

"...Jews thrive under Muslim rule, especially after Islam expanded into Byzantine lands,

where Orthodox rulers routinely persecuted both Jews and non-Orthodox Christians for their religious beliefs, often forcing them to convert to Imperial Christianity under penalty of death. In contrast, Muslim law, which considers Jews and Christians 'protected peoples' (dhimmi), neither required nor encouraged their conversion to Islam... Muslim persecution of the dhimmi was not only forbidden by Islamic law, it was in direct defiance of Muhammad's orders to his expanding armies never to trouble Jews in their practice of Judaism, and always to preserve the Christian institutions they encountered. ... warning that 'he who wrongs a Jew or a Christian will have me as his accuser on the Day of Judgment.' (Reza Aslan, "No god but God," Random House, 2005, pp. 94-5, 101)

investments in alternative fuels. It is not unreasonable to think that the trillion dollars we are spending on Iraq would be sufficient to have brought us to energy independence if spent on alternative fuels development instead.

Even with the efforts outlined above, we need to be prepared for setbacks, difficulty and backsliding, and keep our spirit of goodwill and resolve in the face of them.

Heated rhetoric doesn't mean that the people of these countries are permanently pitted against America. In our revolutionary war, a number of Americans used the term "Great Satan" and worse to describe England and its leaders. This type of propaganda is often part of an attempt to shape a distinct identity and to articulate a new order.

The United States must set an example for the Islamic community by its own conduct. Practicing the values of freedom, friendship and justice that are the spirit of America and rejecting repressive regimes, coups, torture, illegal detention and the murder of civilians sends a stronger message than any act of force or coercion.

As we have seen, in some instances, our dependence on foreign oil has compromised our judgment and values in dealing with certain foreign governments. Over the long term, we should be making intelligent, concerted

THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION ON IRAQ AND TERRORISM & OBJECTIONS TO OUR THESIS

As this essay has attempted to illustrate, the administration's position on Iraq and terrorism demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature and causes of these acts of violence.

The validity of any theory is shown in its predictive power. The Administration's belief in the value of democracy is correct. But its belief in the causes of terrorism, its belief that "they hate us because we are free," and its prescribed solutions are badly off the mark.

This administration's theory, stripped to its essence, is that terrorists are evil and if we kill them all, and destroy those who support them, terrorism will end. But as Aslan noted above regarding the fundamentalist brand of extremism, *"The more one tries to squelch it, the stronger it becomes. Counter it with cruelty, it gains adherents. Kill its leaders, and they become martyrs."* The intelligence on which we invaded Iraq was wrong, but the theory on which terrorism is being fought is equally wrong. In the long run, that may prove to be an even graver mistake.

We hear some say that we can't leave Iraq because "Americans don't run." "Running" or "not running" are not the correct benchmarks. Our

obligation is to understand our true objectives and to show wisdom. It is not a question of military strength or bravery. Historically, no country's military has dominated the other countries of the world the way ours does today, and that will be just as true when we leave Iraq. George Washington, who was our greatest general, side-stepped conflict more than most. His understanding of what the true objective was and what winning truly required led him to avoid most battles—yet win the war. Leaving Iraq under the Biden-Gelb plan will be an act of intelligence, not surrender, and instances of terrorism will go down, not up.

We hear that if we leave our absence will encourage the enemy. We hear that if we

an exit date it will encourage the enemy. We hear that if we criticize our government or its strategy we will encourage the enemy. But terrorists are highly encouraged now, and our current policies in Iraq play directly into their hands. As noted

with France in Algeria in 1961 and America in Vietnam in 1972, departure brought no catastrophe. The only thing that will discourage them is if we address and overcome the true causes of terrorism.

Other apologists for the war are now saying



that “we would rather fight terrorism over there than have to fight it over here” and note that there has not been “another 9/11.” This view has at least three major problems. First, the trillion dollars America is spending on the war has meant that it is underfunding domestic defense. The United States recently cut spending on protecting Washington D.C. and New York City—the very cities that were attacked. Secondly, the instances of terrorism have increased since 9/11 and occurred around the world, in London, Spain, Bali and many other places. Our heightened awareness has no doubt helped thwart terrorist plans in the U.S. thus far, but our defense against domestic attacks is unrelated to the war in Iraq. Thirdly, the idea that we might have to “fight terrorists over here” misses the fact that al Qaeda’s fight is primarily an internal struggle for ascendance within Islam. They strike out against the U.S. and others to gain visibility and a higher profile within the Islamic world, and because we support their opposition. Our best defense is a change of policy, not heightened aggression.

There are some who equate our “stand against terrorism” with the stand against Hitler in the 1930s, and say that those who don’t have the stomach for the Iraqi war are like Neville Chamberlain appeasing Hitler in 1938. We are not advocating appeasing terrorists.

However, reflecting on World War II can be instructive, especially the events that led up to it. We believe that if diplomacy had been maturely applied in the summer of 1914, or in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, World War II would never have occurred and there would not have been a radical leader of Germany to contend with. But at both those pivotal moments there were too few who possessed the world view of George Marshall and too many with the world view of our current administration’s. Clear counsel and greatly improved communications in the summer of 1914 would have prevented World War I and its 21 million casualties. If a “Marshall Plan” had been deployed in 1919 instead of the recriminating and humiliating penalties that emanated from the Paris Peace

Conference of that year, as Keynes suggested, the harsh economic circumstances and bitter feelings in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s that gave rise to Hitler would have never occurred. The retribution of 1919 became the National Socialist Party of the 1930s. As we stated earlier in this essay, oppression most often results in even more terrible subsequent events.

Some assert that the war on terror will inevitably last for decades. They state that the Cold War took decades to win and therefore this war will, too. We would agree that if it is prosecuted in the current manner, it will last for decades. But it doesn’t have to. There are as many differences as similarities between the current specter of terrorism and the Cold War’s specter of communism, and most of our “wars” have ended far sooner than this. It was not our military that brought the demise of the Soviet state; the Soviet Union imploded on its own. Communism was an unsustainable form of government in that it depended on the majority of the governed being willing to work for the benefit of others rather than for themselves. It therefore almost immediately yielded to totalitarianism, and totalitarian states simply cannot compete against capitalist states in the creation of wealth. The threat of communism taking over the world, so manifest in the “domino theory,” was always hollow. The communists simply couldn’t afford to take over the world.

Among the many conscientious leaders in our country today, there are unfortunately those who promote this vision of Islam as the Evil Power in order to garner votes. This ‘politics of fear’ has been shown again and again to be a powerful tactic. It happened in the McCarthy Era, and it happened in Vietnam. We must not let it happen again here. There are even those apologists for the war who, echoing the communist domino theory of the past and current radical rhetoric, actually warn that extremist Muslims will “pick off all non-Muslim nations one by one” and won’t quit until “they have re-established the caliphate in Spain.” Fortunately, these are minority views,

but reflect the profound lack of understanding about this issue.

We hear those who say that our cultures are too different for us ever to get along. But cultural differences as pronounced as these have been overcome on countless occasions throughout history. As others have observed, the first half of the twentieth century was drenched in the blood spilled by German and Japanese aggression, yet only a few decades later it is hard to think of two countries more pacific. Sweden spent the seventeenth century rampaging through Europe, yet it is now an icon of nurturing tranquility. We also hear that some of our fellow citizens support the war because, as Christians, they are against the Muslim religion. Yet our reading of the New Testament would show it to be a Christian's responsibility to approach others, including Muslims, with respect and love.

CONCLUSION

We are not strengthening domestic defenses against terrorism adequately—nor pursuing true global terrorists vigorously—because of the enormous financial drain and military distraction of Iraq. That onerous burden diverts money from causes that could in fact make the world safer.

The war in Iraq is increasing the number of terrorists and the instances of terrorism world-wide because our administration has a misunderstanding of the true nature and causes of this violence.

Because of this same lack of understanding, we are not laying the diplomatic and economic groundwork necessary to reduce terrorism in the future.

Acts of oppression and occupation, the tinder of terrorism, will not quietly disappear. We have the opportunity to make a difference, especially in those areas of the world where population growth soars, economic equality worsens, and the seeds of extremism take root.

War will not rid the world of terrorism. Force does not subdue, it enrages. We have the opportunity to lead the world out of this danger by building up, not tearing down.

Friendship. The protection of the individual. A helping hand. These are what America truly exemplifies, and what America should continue to symbolize to the world.

America has an unparalleled opportunity. It is in our own self-interest to act. But while it is our duty, it is also our great honor to strive to be a light in the world when so much is in shadows.



ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Richard W. Vague has had a thirty year career in banking, including tenure as President of a New York Stock Exchange listed financial services firm that was among the best performing on the exchange. In addition to his business interests, Richard was founder in 2003 of American Respect, an organization committed to exploring the economic development aspects of reducing terrorism.

ABOUT AMERICAN RESPECT

American Respect is a not-for-profit organization that believes invading Iraq has increased global terrorism, is costing thousands of lives, (and literally trillions of tax dollars) and is increasing energy costs. It believes the United States should take a very different approach to addressing this problem. Its principles for reducing terrorism are:

- **Pursue true terrorists** that attack the U.S., such as al Qaeda, by eliminating training camps, preventing arms smuggling, freezing financial assets and apprehending terrorist leaders.
- **Find balanced solutions** in sensitive areas which foment terrorism by rebuilding international coalitions. Violence in regions like Chechnya, Kashmir and especially Palestine directly and adversely affects the entire Muslim world.
- **Decrease our profile** in Iraq and use international coalitions to lead a march toward guaranteed rights, limited government and democratic representation. Further recognize that Iraq was arbitrarily assembled in 1919 from three ethnically and religiously different Ottoman provinces, and that a peaceful solution may require a return, either partly or fully, to a federation that creates a soft partition amongst Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds.
- **Build up the economies** of Muslim countries with the goal of creating a larger middle class in each. If abject poverty is a breeding ground for terrorism, then creating broad prosperity is a key part of the solution--especially in the areas of trade and land reform. And success in the economies of any Muslim country--from Morocco to Indonesia--is positive for stability and peace throughout the region. This must be accompanied by a more decentralized, representational, democratic government.
- **Establish a tone of goodwill** in policies and actions toward these nations and their growing and increasingly global populations.

AMERICAN RESPECT.COM



American Respect
PO Box 26324
Wilmington, DE 19899
www.americanrespect.com
www.americaspurpose.org
comments@americanrespect.com